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Network effects can reduce consumption levels across customers when a monopolist chooses optimal nonlinear
pricing. The direction and extent of these distortions depend on the relative rates of variation in marginal intrinsic
value and marginal network value with customer type.
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1. Introduction
This paper analyzes optimal monopoly pricing under incomplete information for a good that displays
positive network effects. In contrast with standard models of network effects (Katz and Shapiro, 1985),
the good modeled in this paper is consumed in variable quantities by heterogeneous customers, and the
magnitude of the network effects therefore depends on the total quantity consumed across customers,
rather than the total number of adopters. In addition, the value each customer gets on account of the
network effects depends on the customer’s individual consumption, as well as the customer’s type.
Examples of products that fit this description at least partially include corporate desktop software (where
customers are corporations of varying sizes, with varying intensity of software usage across employees)
and online trading services (such as those offered by eBay, where network effects increase with
increased trading volume).0165-1765/$ - see front matter D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2003.10.009
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A monopolist sells a homogeneous network good which may be used in continuously varying
quantities. Fixed and variable production costs are assumed to be zero. Customers are heterogeneous,
indexed by type ha[0,1] which has an absolutely continuous distribution function F(h). The preferences
of a customer of type h are represented by U(q,h,Q) p, where q is the individual consumption of the
customer, Q is the gross consumption across all customers, and p is total price.
For each Qz 0, U(q,h,Q) has properties in q and h that are standard in nonlinear pricing problems:1
for finite q, U1(q,h,Q) > 0, U11(q,h,Q) < 0, U12(q,h,Q) >0, and ddh
U11ðq;h;QÞ
U1ðq;h;QÞ
 
< 0. U(q,h,Q) is assumed
to be bounded. The hazard rate of the distribution of h, denoted HðhÞ ¼ f ðhÞ
1FðhÞ , is assumed
nondecreasing. Additionally, U(q,h,Q) can be separated into two components:
Uðq; h;QÞ ¼ vðq; hÞ þ wðq; h;QÞ; ð1Þ
where v(q,h) is termed intrinsic value, and w(q,h,Q) is termed network value. In the absence of network
effects, it is assumed that U(q,h,Q) = v(q,h), which allows a straightforward comparison of outcomes
with those that obtain in the absence of network effects. The network effects are positive, so
w3(q,h,Q)z 0; in addition, w(q,h,0) = 0 for all q,h, which implies that U(q,h,0) = v(q,h), and v(q,h),
therefore, has all the properties ascribed to U(q,h,Q) in its first two arguments.
Since U1(q,h,Q)>0 for all finite q and U(q,h,Q) is bounded, limq!lU1ðq; h;QÞ ¼ 0. The efficient
consumption level is therefore infinite for all types.
2.1. Feasible pricing
Nonlinear pricing schedules (contracts) are represented by quantity–price pairs q(h),s(h) indexed by
ha[0,1]. Given an expectation Q of gross consumption that is shared by all customers, a contract
q(h),s(h) is said to be feasible for Q if, for each h, it satisfies incentive compatibility and individual
rationality:
haargmax
t
UðqðtÞ; t;QÞ  sðtÞ; ð2Þ
UðqðhÞ; h;QÞ  sðhÞz0: ð3Þ
A contract q(h),s(h) satisfies fulfilled expectations (Radner, 1982) if it is feasible for Q ¼ m10qðhÞ
f ðhÞdh.
2.2. Optimal pricing
The monopolist seeks the profit-maximizing feasible contract that satisfies fulfilled expectations. This
contract is denoted q*(h),s*(h). Fix an expectation Q of gross consumption that is shared by all1 Numbered subscripts of functions refer to partial derivatives with respect to the corresponding variable.
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the profit-maximizing feasible contract, denoted q(h,Q),s(h,Q), will solve
U12ðqðh;QÞ; h;QÞ
U1ðqðh;QÞ; h;QÞ ¼ HðhÞ ð4Þ
sðh;QÞ ¼ Uðqðh;QÞ; h;QÞ 
Z h
0
U2ðqðt;QÞ; t;QÞdt; ð5Þ
for each ha[0,1] and will be unique for a fixed, exogenously specified Q. Given any such Q, we define
the actual consumption function
CðQÞ ¼
Z 1
0
qðh;QÞf ðhÞdh; ð6Þ
where q(h,Q) is defined according to Eq. (4). Combining profit maximization and the restriction of
satisfying fulfilled expectations, it follows that the optimal contract satisfies Eqs. (4) and (5) for a value
of Q that is a fixed point of C(Q). Using Eq. (1), this implies that q*(h),s*(h) satisfies
v12ðq*ðhÞ; hÞ þ w12ðq*ðhÞ; h;Q*Þ
v1ðq*ðhÞ; hÞ þ w1ðq*ðhÞ; h;Q*Þ ¼ HðhÞ ð7Þ
s*ðhÞ ¼ vðq*ðhÞ; hÞ þ wðq*ðhÞ; h;Q*Þ 
Z h
0
½v2ðq*ðtÞ; tÞ þ w2ðq*ðtÞ; t;Q*Þdt; ð8Þ
where Q*m10q*ðhÞf ðhÞdh . There may be multiple contracts which satisfy these conditions, since the
uniqueness of a fixed point of C(Q) is not guaranteed.2 The existence of a fixed point of C(Q) is
discussed in Appendix A; the monopolist simply picks the one that is most profitable. Finally, we denote
the optimal contract in the absence of network effects as qo(h),so(h). This contract is unique and
specified by
v12ðqoðhÞ; hÞ
v1ðqoðhÞ; hÞ ¼ HðhÞ ð9Þ
soðhÞ ¼ vðqoðhÞ; hÞ 
Z h
0
v2ðqoðtÞ; tÞdt: ð10Þ
For type h= 1, both these contracts yield the efficient individual consumption level q =l. Since F(h)
is absolutely continuous, H(h)>0 for h < 1, and consumption is finite for types ha[0,1).2 The existence of a fixed point of C(Q) is discussed in Appendix A.
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One can now compare outcomes in the presence of network effects with those obtained in their
absence. If one defines Qo ¼ m10qoðhÞf ðhÞdh, then the contract
qðhÞ ¼ qoðhÞ;
sðhÞ ¼ soðhÞ þ wðqoðhÞ; h;QoÞ 
Z h
o
w2ðqoðtÞ; t;QoÞdt
 
is feasible, satisfies fulfilled expectations, and yields strictly higher profits in the presence of network
effects than qo(h),so(h) does in their absence. Since q*(h),s*(h) yields profits at least as high as those
from q(h),s(h), the presence of network effects is always strictly profit improving for the monopolist. It is
also straightforward to show that consumer surplus of type h strictly increases if q*(h)z qo(h) and
Q*zQo. If these conditions are not met, the direction of change in surplus depends on the interaction
between individual consumption q and gross consumption Q in the function w(q,h,Q).
Characterizing the direction of changes in consumption requires the following lemma:Lemma 1. If d
dh
U11ðq;h;QÞ
U1ðq;h;QÞ
 
< 0; then d
dq
U12ðq;h;QÞ
U1ðq;h;QÞ
 
> 0:
Proof
d
dh
U11ðq; hÞ
U1ðq; hÞ
 
¼ U112ðq; hÞU1ðq; hÞ þ U11ðq; hÞU12ðq; hÞðU1ðq; hÞÞ2
; ð11Þ
and
d
dq
U1ðq; hÞ
U12ðq; hÞ
 
¼ U11ðq; hÞU12ðq; hÞ  U112ðq; hÞU1ðq; hÞðU12ðq; hÞÞ2
: ð12Þ
The denominators of the RHS of Eqs. (11) and (12) are both strictly positive, and their numerators are
identical. Therefore, d
dq
U1ðq;hÞ
U12ðq;hÞ
 
< 0, which implies that d
dq
U12ðq;hÞ
U1ðq;hÞ
 
> 0. 5
Lemma 1 enables the comparison of individual consumption levels that are induced by the optimal
contract q*(h),s*(h) with those that occur in the absence of network effects:Proposition 1. For each h:
(a) If
v12ðq*ðhÞ;hÞ
v1ðq*ðhÞ;hÞ <
w12ðq*ðhÞ;h;Q*Þ
w1ðq*ðhÞ;h;Q*Þ , then q*(h) < q
o(h).
(b) If
v12ðq*ðhÞ;hÞ > w12ðq*ðhÞ;h;Q*Þ, then q*(h)>qo(h).
v1ðq*ðhÞ;hÞ w1ðq*ðhÞ;h;Q*Þ
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v12ðq*ðhÞ;hÞ
v1ðq*ðhÞ;hÞ <
w12ðq*ðhÞ;h;Q*Þ
w1ðq*ðhÞ;h;Q*Þ : Straightforward algebra
3 yields
v12ðq*ðhÞ; hÞ þ w12ðq*ðhÞ; h;Q*Þ
v1ðq*ðhÞ; hÞ þ w1ðq*ðhÞ; h;Q*Þ >
v12ðq*ðhÞ; hÞ
v1ðq*ðhÞ; hÞ : ð13Þ
Eqs. (7) and (13) yield
v12ðq*ðhÞ; hÞ
v1ðq*ðhÞ; hÞ < HðhÞ: ð14Þ
Eqs. (9) and (14) yield
v12ðq*ðhÞ; hÞ
v1ðq*ðhÞ; hÞ <
v12ðqoðhÞ; hÞ
v1ðqoðhÞ; hÞ : ð15Þ
Lemma 1 ensures that d
dq
v12ðq;hÞ
v1ðq;hÞ
 
> 0, and part (a) follows. Similar steps yield part (b). 5
Immediate corollaries are that if w(q,h,Q) is constant in q, then individual consumption is unchanged
by network effects for all types, since w(q,h,Q) =w12(q,h,Q) = 0. Alternately, if network value is
increasing in individual and gross consumption, but constant in h, then individual consumption increases
for all but the highest type, since w1(q,h,Q)>0, while w12(q,h,Q) = 0 at any q,h,Q, implying that
q*(h)>q
0(h) for ha[0,1). Profits and consumer surplus increase as well, and this might be expected as a
‘normal’ consequence of the presence of positive network effects. Both these cases are characterized in
some detail in Sundararajan (2003).
However, the general case admits a wider variety of outcomes. Proposition 1 makes sense intuitively
if one recognizes
v12ðq;hÞ
v1ðq;hÞ as the percentage change in marginal intrinsic value that results from a marginal
increase in type, and
w12ðq;h;QÞ
w1ðq;h;QÞ as the percentage change in marginal network value for a marginal
increase in type. Consider, for instance, the case when
w12ðq;h;QÞ
w1ðq;h;QÞ >
v12ðq;hÞ
v1ðq;hÞ for all q<l, ha[0,1], and at all
values of Q. In this case, the network effects increase the marginal impact of an increase in type on total
marginal value (or loosely, makes the customer types more different from each other). Consequently, the
monopolist changes pricing in a manner that increases the differences in consumption across types,
which reduces consumption for all but the highest type. Accordingly, Proposition 1(a) concludes that
q*(h) < q
0(h) for ha[0,1). This distortion occurs despite the fact that the positive network effects increase
value from consumption for all types, at all consumption levels. Any increase in consumption for a
subset of types would increase the total surplus generated by all types, but at the cost of reducing the
monopolist’s ability to price discriminate. This case therefore highlights socially suboptimal trade-offs
that a price-discriminating monopolist who controls a network good can make between value creation
and price discrimination.
The reduction in individual consumption across all types described above is because efficient
individual consumption is infinite for the highest type (or more importantly, because efficient individual
consumption levels are unaltered by the network effects). In contrast, if the efficient level for the highest3 For a, b, c, d >0, a
b
< c
d
Z bc ad>0. Therefore, aþc
bþd  ab ¼ bcadbðbþdÞ > 0; or aþcbþd > ab.
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for a subset (of positive measure) of types. Under the condition
w12ðq;h;QÞ
w1ðq;h;QÞ >
v12ðq;hÞ
v1ðq;hÞ, this subset would be an
interval of higher types; the reduction in individual consumption would be induced for the remaining
interval of (lower) types, so long as the increase in efficient levels was highest for h= 1. Network effects
of this kind therefore increase consumption and surplus disparities across types, and while benefiting
higher customer types, may have a net negative effect on the other (lower type) customers.4. Conclusion
Network effects always increase monopoly profits. However, their presence can cause a price-
discriminating monopolist to distort individual consumption in a manner that reduces consumption
for a fraction of (and sometimes all) customer types, and this may adversely affect the magnitude
and distribution of consumer surplus. Ongoing work aims to refine the characterization of changes
in consumption by placing more structure on the network value function w(q,h,Q), and by
exploiting properties of the optimal pricing schedule. Solving a multidimensional model which
allows changes in individual and network value to vary with independent dimensions of type is also
work in progress.Acknowledgements
I thank Luis Cabral, Nicholas Economides, Roy Radner, participants at the 2003 meeting of the
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory and seminar participants at New York University for
their comments. The usual disclaimers apply.Appendix A. Existence of a nontrivial fixed point of C(Q)
Since U(q,h,0) = v (q,h), it follows that C(0) =Qo, where Qo ¼ m10qoðhÞf ðhÞdh. Therefore, C(0) >0. As
a consequence, if C(Q) is bounded, a fixed point exists at some Q>0. Recall the definition of C(Q)
CðQÞ ¼
Z 1
0
qðh;QÞf ðhÞdh;
and define
q¯ðhÞ ¼ lim
Q!l
qðh;QÞ:
Since F(h) is absolutely continuous, any condition that ensures the finiteness of q¯(h) for all h< 1 will
ensure that limQ!lCðQÞ is finite.
Suppose the sequence of functions U(q,h,Q) indexed by Q converges uniformly to a limit u¯(q,h) as
Q!l. It follows that
lim U1ðq; h;QÞ ¼ u¯1ðq; hÞ:
Q!l
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Q, and therefore, limq!lu¯1ðq; hÞ ¼ 0. As a result, as long as q¯(h) is well defined, it is finite for all h< 1,
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